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THE REPUBLICAN ERA: 1869-1901.

A STUDY IN ADMINIS-

TRATIVE HISTORY. By LEONARD D. WHITE with the assistance
of JEAN SCHNEIDER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958.

Pp. ix, 406. $6.00.
John M. Gaus t
This book is the final one in the series of four studies in the administrative history of our national government to which Leonard White dedicated the later years of his life. More than the earlier volumes (The Federalists,The Jeffersonians, The Jacksonians) the present one may profitably
be read as a separate study.
Early in his long career of teaching and research, in fact, in the preface
to the first edition of his textbook which appeared in 1926, White declared
that the primary emphasis of his work was on administrative organization,
personnel and management, rather than on law. This emphasis prevails in
the present work. If justification is needed, it is amply provided in the
general neglect which the study of our administrative experience, in the
sense used by White, has suffered. Some valuable pioneering has been
undertaken in our time by such scholars as Lloyd Short and Gustavus A.
Weber; and more studies, some stimulated by White, are appearing. And
for the period with which this book deals, there are the classic essays by
Henry Adams, to which White also refers, as well as the penetrating later
appraisals in chapters 7 and 16-27 of The Education of Henry Adams.
But White and Miss Schneider have culled the Archives here again
to our advantage. The final third of the book, in which the narrative records the emergent new functions reflecting the development of the applied
sciences and the growth of economic interdependence, and the resultant need
for reform in civil service policy, is a uniquely valuable contribution. It
begins with the passage of the first legislation in 1853 (which is also significantly the year of the Northcote-Trevelyan report in Great Britain on
which subsequent development of the civil service merit system was based
in that country), and continues through the work of Jenckes, the Act of
1871, and the Pendleton Act, which, as Adams said in his Education, was
"an attempt to correct a vice that should never have been allowed to be
born." It is here that the reader most keenly appreciates the author's
special qualifications as a man who gave a major part of his creative effort,
both in academic posts and in public positions, to the civil service in our own
t Mr. Gaus, Professor of Government at Harvard, is hintself a distinguilshed
teacher and scholar of public admiistration.
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day. This is history from the inside, in which White as a Civil Service
Commissioner describes the administration of legislation which he himself
was called upon to administer fifty years later.
The earlier chapters give substance, setting and interpretation to
White's account of the civil service question. He begins with one of general
characterization of the administrative system as we emerged from the
Civil War.
"During the thirty years from Grant to McKinley, two great
controversies dominated the administrative scene. One involved the
rejuvenation of executive power and leadership after the impeachment
of President Andrew Johnson and the surrender of President Ulysses
S. Grant to the Senate. The second was concerned with civil service
reform, a battle that had an important if indirect bearing on the fortunes of executive power, on the nature of political parties, and on the
standards of political morality." (p. 17).
But "the thirty-odd years from 1869 to 1901 had produced almost no
interest in administration other than reform." (p. 19). The period was
one, in Adams' word, of "tinkering"-although "the system of 1789 had
broken down," when measured by the domestic and international problems
that confront us. The lack of a concept of executive or of legislative responsible leadership, and the widely prevailing view of government policy as
an aspect of private and speculative enterprise, were interrelated.
In two chapters, White describes the resultant chaos as "The Struggle
for Power" in terms of President and Congress, and Congress and Administration; in two more, he treats "Congress and Departmental Business" and
"The President and Departmental Business." In all this he searches, in
keeping with his general conception of administration, for the appearance
of some idea and practice of general administrative responsibility and leadership in a Presidency staffed to meet such responsibility throughout the
executive branch. But while "the curve of presidential leadership was
upward" (p. 18), the mind of the President "was directed primarily to
Congress, not to the executive departments." (p. 392).
These, indeed, were tending to go their own way, as his seven chapters
on the substantive departments and agencies illustrate in detail; and even
within them, there was little sense of a corporate department. Root's proposals, at the end of the period surveyed, for a General Staff are indeed
revolutionary (p. 153). Agriculture introduced on a larger scale a new and
subsequently characteristic aspect of contemporary government-scientific
services. "The key to the success of the Department of Agriculture consisted in the quality of its leadership and of its scientific corps." (p. 256).
White concludes that, "considering the state of administrative doctrine
from 1870 to 1900, we must conclude that these were years of stagnation.
. Reform was the dominant concern of the country, not the formulation of doctrine." (pp. 395-96).
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There is little direct treatment of administrative law in this period in
White's account, although larger constitutional issues relating to the
Presidency and to the appointing and dismissal powers are given appropriate
treatment and the case of Ex parte Curtis1 is summarized (p. 334).
Only at the close of the period was the work of Frank Goodnow in this
field to shed its influence, and later still such distinguished works as John
Dickinson's Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law. White's
chapter on "Public Service Ethics," however, leads the reader into wide
and fruitful aspects of our cultural history and invites the reappraisal of
some of our present discontents. And as with the earlier volumes, there is
a rich plenty in the discovery and citation of persons in the public service
doing creative work that is some part of the base of our present civic life,
a true "usable past." To read this final volume is to acquire a more mature
conception of our institutions and culture. We owe this to one who marked
out a strategy and practiced tactics of research with deliberation, and pursued both with great industry, integrity, and enjoyment.

THE MARCH OF CONQUEST. THE GERMAN VICTORIES IN WESTERN
By TELFORD TAYLOR. New York: Simon and
EUROPE, 1940.
Schuster, 1958. Pp. xiv, 460. $7.50.
Gordon B. Turner t
In the spring and summer of 1940 it looked to the world as though
nothing could halt the Nazi "march of conquest." Under the "inspired"
strategic direction of Hitler and his generals, the Wehrmacht was sweeping
through Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France with a speed which
took the breath away. The tactical brilliance of the German military forces
appeared to make them unbeatable. Even in retrospect we tend to view
this as a period of darkness-the beginning rather than the end of a long
series of Allied reverses. Mr. Taylor, however, now offers convincing
arguments that, at least in the strategic sense, this was the turning point of
the war (p. 366). Far from being great strategists, Hitler and the professional soldiers of the German High Command were inflicted with a kind
of myopia which clouded their objectives and launched them upon a series
of strategic blunders which could not be offset by the tactical efficiency of
the war machine they had created. These blunders ultimately cost them
the war by causing them to neglect England at the only time when her defeat
might have been possible.
1. 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
t Mr. Turner is the editor of A History of Military Affairs Since the Eighteenth
Century and teaches at Princeton University and the Naval War College.
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Although the German leaders were agreed that Allied surrender was
the desired goal, they were so taken up with the day-to-day course of conquest that they failed to consider how their march was to be brought to a
successful conclusion. They hoped for England's capitulation as soon as
she was isolated from the continent by the collapse of the maritime states,
but their plans were not designed to make that hope a reality. Annihilation
of the British armies in the Battle of France and an immediate amphibious
assault across the Channel should have had top priority in German strategic
planning from the outset, but they did not. The Navy was risked and
severely battered in the invasion of Norway, thus making an assault on
England virtually impossible, and preoccupation with the conquest of France
permitted 350,000 allied troops to escape from Dunkirk to fight again. Only
after the fall of France did the German leadership begin to consider what
to do next. This delay was fatal, and Hitler was soon plunging into other
ventures in the vain hope that England could be brought to her knees by
German victories in North Africa, the Middle East and Russia.
The story told here is one of operational excellence brought to nought
by incredible inefficiency and wrangling in the nation's political and military
leadership. Years of bad relations between Sword and Swastika, which
Mr. Taylor ably recounted in a previous volume of that name (1952), continued to haunt the German war machine in this period. Hitler's instability,
his power to force through his own decisions, and his inability to prevent
inter-service rivalries produced error and indecision. "By a strange but
appropriate irony," Mr. Taylor says, "it was especially in the sphere of
strategic decision-making, where by common supposition dictatorships are
more swift, flexible, and cold-blooded than democracies, that the Reich was
found wanting." (p. 373). Industrialists and Nazi politicians by their
occupation policies wrecked any chance that Germany's enemies and the
still neutral United States might let Hitler keep his conquests. The
Oberkomnmando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the nation's "creaky supercommand" structure, was unable to compel the three services-land, sea,
and air-to function as a unit. The Navy, which was more strategic minded
than the other services, and early saw the necessity of defeating England
by battle rather than by terror, was without influence. The Luftwaffe under
Hermann Goering insisted upon acting as it saw fit without regard to
strategic operations as a whole. It was Goering, for example, who delayed
tightening the ring at Dunkirk because he wanted a part in smashing the
encircled forces from the air. The Army, however, was the senior service
and ordinarily had its way. As a result the Wehrmacht was unbalanced.
It had been created solely to overrun the continent and so was continentbound in thought and action, unable to project itself beyond the coast because its reach was short and its endurance limited.
The author pulls no punches when he disagrees, as he frequently does,
with the generals who fought the war and the historians who have recounted
it. In the face of massive opinion to the contrary he denies that the initial
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Gelb plan for attack in the West was a replica of Schieffen's old plan (p.
161). He refuses to permit Halder to take credit for revising Gelb, and
insists upon calling it the "Manstein variant" (pp. 177-78). In seeking the
causes of the famous stop-order which made the Dunkirk evacuation possible, he does not permit himself the luxury of pinning the blame solely
on one person as the German generals, Churchill and others have done.
Instead he finds a variety of culprits: Hitler, Rundstedt, and Goering (pp.
255-56). A lawyer by training and profession, Mr. Taylor selects and
marshals his evidence with care and presents it ably in these cases. Occasionally, it must be admitted, the reviewer looks in vain for sources to support minor points, but perhaps he should be content to rely on the conclusions of a man who has steeped himself in the literature of his subject. A
vigorous analysis well documented in the main and always refreshingly
presented probably justifies some license here and there.
It is only in the section on the "might-have-beens" (pp. 336 passim)
that serious issues might be taken, if anyone could prove the "ifs" of history.
This portion, going beyond the time limits of the story, is not always convincing to the historian. In speculating on whether Sea Lion, the projected
invasion of England, might have succeeded, the author says: "In any event,
it was not a project of desperation." (p. 362). And he cites as supporting evidence that the Army generals were prepared to undertake it. The
Army, however, was willing to do so only on its own terms; that is, in such
strength and on such a broad front that the Navy could not possibly have
lifted and supported it. The Army was never prepared to execute Sea Lion
on the restricted scale that the Navy considered feasible. When Mr. Taylor
sticks to the facts rather than the fancies of history, however, his analyses
are sound, and his prose always makes delightful reading. The scholarly
apparatus-footnotes, appendices, maps and bibliography-are faultless.
Altogether this is a worthy contribution to the literature of World War II.

